A B S T R A C T
At nearly  million inhabitants, Nigeria is Africa's most populous country by twofold and fertility levels remain higher than most other sub-Saharan African nations. Throughout the last several decades, the fertility gap between Christians and Muslims has widened with significant political implications for a nascent democracy. Where the DHS survey of  revealed a non-significant difference of · children, this figure had increased to · children by . As the total fertility rate (TFR) of Christians decreased significantly from · to · children per woman between  and , the TFR of Muslims increased from · to · children per woman. The timing of this divergence coincides with the formal institutionalization of Sharia law in . We examine the role of religion on education, contraception and family behaviour. Finally, we touch upon the implications for population growth and the religious composition of Nigeria in the coming decades.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
At nearly  million inhabitants, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa by twofold and is on course to become one of the largest countries in the world. It is also one of the most diverse, with a large number of groups from different linguistic and ethnic backgrounds (Katzner ; Lieberman and McClendon ) . Nigeria is also the only state in the world with equal proportions of Christians (·% in ), located mainly in the South, and Muslims (·%) (PEW ) who are living mainly in the Northern regions of the country ( Figure ) . The population balance between the two majority religions, however, is likely to shift in the future as a result of distinctly different trajectories of demographic change. While the Muslim North is currently in an early phase of demographic transition with very high fertility rates, fertility rates of Christians and Muslims in the South are declining as the demographic transition is further underway. These diverging trajectories in demographic behaviour may lead to the end of the current equilibrium between the two religions with significant implications for the future of the country. Within this study we examine possible explanations for divergent population trajectories along religious lines as well as the path that these trajectories may potentially take into the future.
As with several other Western African countries, ethno-regional and religious divides largely overlap in Nigeria and are manifested in a pronounced north-south gap (Mancini ) . Here, inequalities have emerged along geographic and ethnic divisions as well as along socioeconomic lines between nomadic herdsmen and farmers, exacerbated by climate change (e.g. Fasona & Omojola ; Sayne ). While ethnic divides were of great importance in the past, a religious divide now appears to be becoming more pronounced as religious tensions compound traditional ethnic and geopolitical rivalries, magnifying underlying insecurities and grievances.
The past decade has seen increasing reports of sectarian violence in Nigeria's Middle Belt where ethnic and religious communities meet. And in an ominous sign of things to come, these attacks are increasingly framed in terms of religious and cultural conflict. In - Sharia laws were introduced in  states  in northern Nigeria ( Figure  ) leading to religious unrest and an escalation of hostilities that resulted in thousands of deaths in Kaduna state alone (Barker & Ricardo : ; Ostien & Dekker ) . This drastic shift is reflected in the Pew Research Center's Social Hostilities Index which documented a surge from · to · on a -point scale between  and  -one of the highest scores in the world. As part of efforts to establish an Islamic caliphate, attacks on Christians and moderate Muslims by the militant group Boko Haram, which translates literally to 'Western Forbidden', may be orchestrated with the goal of stoking religious tensions between the predominately Christian Igbo in the South and Hausa-Fulani Muslims in the North, with the Yoruba in the West representing a mix of Christianity and Islam.
Within the context of an ethnically and religiously diverse country such as Nigeria, a newfound emphasis on religious identity coupled with religion-specific fertility differentials could carry significant political and economic implications. Indeed, Mazrui () finds that religious divisions in sub-Saharan Africa are most likely to lead to conflict when they reinforce underlying ethnic differences, precisely the situation we now observe in Nigeria. It is particularly important to note that the emergence of militant Islamic sects and possible spread of Sharia law to additional states is potentially a response to the growing north-south gap and perceived political dominance of the South (Isa ). Indeed, while its implementation has ignited hostilities particularly in the border states making up the Middle Belt, Sharia law was being applied to Muslims in most Northern states long before its formal institutionalization (Ostien & Dekker ) . In our paper, first, we discuss factors contributing to the widening gap in the fertility differential between Muslims and Christians. Besides the factors such as contraceptive use and demand for family planning and differences in marital behaviour that fall within the proximate determinants framework (Bongaarts ) , which is a framework highly relevant for understanding of fertility change in sub-Saharan African context, we discuss differences in educational improvements among women and changing fertility ideals. We show that religion per se is not the main driver of stalling fertility among Muslims in Sharia states as there is significant heterogeneity in the reproductive behaviour of Muslims in Nigeria. We argue that fertility stalls and high population growth are specific for Muslims in Sharia states. Therefore, it is not useful to speak of Nigerian Muslims as a homogeneous group.
The second part of the paper demonstrates the consequences of the increased fertility gap on the religious landscape of Nigeria. While the relative similarity in size between Muslims and Christians populations emerged only during the past  years, Muslims have never been a clear majority in a united Nigeria (Mi ) .  This situation may soon change as we identify an ongoing demographic bifurcation that could significantly alter the religious composition of Africa's most populous nation with substantial implications for future population outcomes.
T H E I N C R E A S I N G G A P I N R E L I G I O N -S P E C I F I C F E R T I L I T Y I N N I G E R I A
Using Demographic Health Survey (DHS) surveys,  in this study we identify religion-based fertility differentials and project potential demographic futures based on a number of scenarios. We find that the total fertility rate (TFR) of Christians decreased significantly from · [CI: ·-·] to · children [·-·] per woman between  and  while the TFR of Muslims increased from · [·-·] to · children [·-·] ( Figure ) .  However, fertility is not rising among all Nigerian Muslims. Taking a closer look we find that fertility has increased from · to · children per woman between  and  among Muslims residing in currently Sharia law states (Table I) . However, among those residing elsewhere fertility declined from · to · children per woman. Although this is one child more than the average for a Christian woman, we show that fertility change unfolds in a similar way among Christians and Muslims from non-Sharia states.  Interestingly enough, the timing of the divergence in fertility trends coincides with the formal introduction of Sharia law over the course of several years following the  return to civil rule and subsequent reinstatement of constitutional law (Kendhammer ; for an overview see Oba ; Ostien and Dekker ). This leads to questions regarding how Sharia law or culture specific to those regions where Sharia law has been institutionalized fosters high fertility. As discussed in the next section, we hypothesize that the adoption of Sharia and societal norms related to its practice sustains high fertility culture and contributes to increasing fertility differentials. The widening gap in fertility by religion can thus be understood as a result of persistent high fertility and pronatalist culture among Muslims in Sharia law states contrasted with a progressing fertility transition among Christians and moderate Muslims residing in the Southern states.
The institutionalization of Sharia law in  northern states beginning in  and consequent subjugation of the English legal system represented a return to Islamic primacy which has not been observed since the pre-colonial period (Ostien & Dekker ) . However, the spread of Sharia law and extended jurisdiction to cover criminal as well as civil matters was the culmination of gradual and some would argue inevitable decline of the system of common law that was imposed on Nigeria during colonialism (Oba ) . Indeed, Sharia law was already being carried out among Nigerian Muslims in the realm of civil/personal law prior to official institutionalization (Nmehielle ) . The full implementation of Sharia law can thus be viewed as symptomatic of preexisting societal preferences as well as emblematic of a nascent movement away from Western conceptions of law, education and the secular state.
While the institutionalization of Sharia law in the northern states occurred relatively recently, Islam has long been an integral aspect of the religious and political landscape of northern Nigeria, culminating in the Sokoto Caliphate of the early th century and near total replacement of customary law with Islamic law (Ostien & Dekker ) . During 
*Because of the small number of observations it was not possible to calculate TFR for Christians in Sharia states in .
this period southern Nigeria was awarded as a protectorate to the British, resulting in the introduction of English law in the South while a system of indirect rule (through local proxies) led to a two-tier legal system in the North which included native/customary law (with elements of Islamic law) and English law. In contrast with the North, Sharia law never supplanted customary personal law in the southern states of Nigeria and southern Muslims have traditionally adhered to tribal customs in most legal matters (Ostien & Dekker ) . Thus, although customary law in South Muslim communities often reflects the influence of Islamic law, the norms and procedures regulating marital law have remained uncodified and thus largely contingent on local customs. In the North, however, the legal ease and societal norms associated with marriage and divorce have been identified as key contributors to high fertility by motivating women within polygynous marriages to maximize their number of children in order to prevent divorce and ensure their share of inheritance (Izugbara & Ezeh ) .
Although the Quran does not prohibit birth control in marriage and it is permitted for a wide range of justifiable reasons (Omran ), opposition to modern contraception and family planning programmes emerged in some contexts where these are seen as an import from the West and a deviation from 'the right path' (Roudi-Fahimi ). For these reasons it is not uncommon that family planning programmes would be politicized in Muslim societies. In this context, strict adherence to Sharia law could imply a lack of sexual health education and/or suspicion toward modern forms of contraception, as well as the relatively low educational levels among young girls. Mazrui () outlines several ways in which Islamic fundamentalism can affect fertility such as distrust of the West, association of contraception with prostitution, Quran-based fatalistic attitudes regarding procreation, attitudes toward polygyny and large families, subversion of traditional birth spacing, and encouragement of a large age gap between husbands and wives. Within this analysis we will focus primarily on the interplay of Sharia, education, and family planning and its implications for differential Christian-Muslim fertility levels.
Sharia law and the implicit societal norms associated with its practice can influence fertility levels through a number of indirect and direct causal avenues including lowered age of marriage as well as outright prohibitions on formal education.  While there is variation among different schools of thought, puberty marks the age of marriage for young girls under classical Sharia (Rehman ) . In addition to the increased prevalence of pregnancy and implications for educational attendance, child brides are frequently forbidden from attending school or lack the time to continue their education (Warner ) . A low marriage age thus results in higher fertility by increasing the probability of pregnancy while impeding access to education that could result in lower fertility preferences (Westoff et al. ) . Disparate age differences are also conducive to patriarchy, resulting in increased male control over contraceptive practices and reproductive behaviour which evidence suggests leads to higher realised fertility (Ezeh et al. ; Isiugo-Abanihe ; Bankole & Singh ).
Societal norms, patriarchy, and a resistance towards Western influence -which are sustained by Sharia law -seem to play a role in high fertility culture among Muslims in northern Nigeria. High fertility of Muslims in the Sharia states is coupled with persistently high fertility ideals ( Figure ) . In  only about % of Muslim women in Sharia states were in favour of relatively smaller families (with two to four children) while large family ideals remain the norm with % of women considering at least seven children ideal, and an additional % stated that they would accept any number of children God grants them. Fertility ideals did not change much among the Muslim women in Sharia states between  and .  Although more women now give a numeric response to the question, a fairly stable share of those who wish to have many children (more than  or 'any number') suggests that unlimited fertility and large family ideas are well embedded in the states that adopted Sharia law.
In contrast, fertility ideals have shifted towards smaller families among Christians and to a lesser extent also among Muslims in non-Sharia states. Muslim women residing in non-Sharia states not only have a lower TFR than those residing in Sharia states, but also differ in their perception of the ideal number of children, with more citing four children as ideal and fewer preferring large families with at least seven children. The ideal family size distribution and trend towards preferences for smaller families among Muslim women residing in non-Sharia states mimics the pattern of Christian women, although their overall fertility ideals are slightly higher than those of Christian women. The apparent difference between fertility ideals of Muslim women in Sharia and non-Sharia states calls for more thorough investigation of situation factors of fertility and deeper understanding of the role of religious leaders and locally embedded cultural practices that give rise to these diverging preferences.
The high fertility gap between Muslims and Christians can also be linked to differences in mean age at marriage and in the practice of polygyny. Our findings confirm that mean age at first marriage remains very low, at about  years for Muslim women in the Sharia states across all waves of DHS (-). Muslim women residing in non-Sharia states marry at about - years, while the mean age at first marriage has increased from  to  years of age among Nigeria's Christians during -. We also see a decline in polygyny among Christians and Muslim women in non-Sharia states (down from % to % among - year olds during -) while the decline in polygynous marriages has halted in the Sharia states according to the  and  DHS. Here the share of women aged - who are in polygynous union settled at %. Polygyny is conducive to higher fertility within the Nigerian context where co-wives are compelled to have as many children as possible in order to economically constrain the husband's ability to take a new wife and ensure their portion of the husband's inheritance (Izugbara & Ezeh ) .
One of the underlying mechanisms behind the changes in reproductive and marital behaviour is education. As we show in the next section, education levels among Christian women significantly increased, while education levels among Muslim women in the Sharia states remain low. Rising education levels, higher contraceptive use and lower desired fertility may have contributed to declining fertility in the largely Christian South. Concurrently and potentially in response to this development, anti-Western attitudes and growing fundamentalism in the largely Muslim North may have resulted in low education levels, early marriage age and retention of pronatalist beliefs. attainment as one of the key factors of fertility decline. Can improvements in educational levels explain variation in fertility levels and the opening gap between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria? As illustrated in Figure  , we observe a widening gap in TFR by religion and also diverging trends over time, with Christian fertility declining and Muslim fertility rising. If trends in education were to explain the fertility gap between Muslims and Christians, we should observe (a) higher educational levels of Christians compared with Muslims, and (b) educational improvement among Christians as opposed to stalling education or even worsening educational characteristics of Muslim women. Nigeria has witnessed educational expansion since the s when primary schooling was made mandatory. Greater enrolment at primary levels translated into increased completion of secondary and higher education  but this seems to be limited to the majority Christian and better developed South. As expected, we find huge differences in educational attainment between Muslim and Christian women in reproductive age ( Figure ) . In  a mere % of Christian women aged - had no formal education and a majority attained at least lower secondary education (%). In contrast, two-thirds of Muslim women had no formal schooling in  and , a modest improvement compared with % with no formal education in . Furthermore, the gap in completed mean years of schooling (MYS) between Christian and Muslim women increased from · to · years from  to  despite significant gains by non-Sharia state Muslims (Table II) . Consistent with the hypothesis of a negative impact of Sharia culture on female educational improvement, the data show that this growing rift is driven entirely by stalled educational gains among Sharia state Muslims, % of which lack any formal education.
H E C H A N G I N G R E L I G I O U S C O M P O S I T I O N O F N I G E R I
The gap in educational attainment is partly sustained by the persistent perception of Western education as being anti-Islamic (Csapo ). Lincove () finds a significant effect of religion on school attendance and Kazeem et al. () show that children from Christian households are five times more likely to attend school compared with those from Muslim households. In particular, female education remains at very low levels. Studies also suggest that many Muslim parents prefer their daughters to attend traditional Islamic schools, because it guarantees preserving religious values and traditional female roles (Ogunjuyigbe & Fadeyi ) . Indeed, Adiri et al. () find that a Quranic education is more common than other types of school among Muslim women (·%).
The expected inverse relationship between education and fertility (Bongaarts ; Skirbekk ) holds and we find that that fertility T A B L E I I Mean years of schooling of women - by religion and region in ,  and .
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is lower among the better educated in both religions ( Figure ) . Among Christians, those with primary or less education had at least six children in , while those with at least secondary only have four children. Between  and , fertility fell by roughly half a child for all educational groups among Christians. Overall, fertility levels were more than one child higher among Muslims compared with Christians within all educational groups. The educational gradient in fertility corresponds to the positive effect of in particular secondary and higher education on the use of modern contraceptives (Ejelmi et al. ) . However, TFR rose substantially among Muslims in the period -. We find the most pronounced increase among those with no education, a smaller increase for those with at least some primary education, and stalled fertility among women with at least completed lower secondary education. This has taken place in spite of modest improvement in the educational attainment of Muslim women ( Figure ) . As can be seen from Table III , the structural effect of increased education depressed the fertility of Muslims by −· children per woman. However, fertility increased by · children per woman once education is controlled for, using a two-component decomposition of fertility . Decreasing age at entering first marriage can lead to a rise in fertility, however, as we showed earlier the mean age at first marriage stays low at about  years but did not decline either. Therefore, other factors, such as possible changes in contraceptive use and possibly the institutionalization of Sharia law, stand behind the increased Muslim fertility in Nigeria.
C O N T R A C E P T I O N
Most extant studies find that contraceptive use is more common among Christian women than Muslim women in Nigeria (Adebowale et al. ). Our analysis reveals that among currently married or co-habiting Christian and Muslim women in Nigeria, there is an increase in contraceptive practice (either using modern or traditional methods) in nonSharia states. Despite this modest increase, only around % of women of reproductive age use modern contraception (see Table IV ) and contraceptive use in Nigeria is low even by regional standards (Bongaarts & Casterline ) . The shares of women using contraception are higher among women aged - compared with younger women. Differences in contraceptive use are significant also between religious groups. Among Christians, the proportion of currently married women not using any method to prevent pregnancy has declined from % to % between  and . The fraction of non-users has also declined among Muslims in non-Sharia states from % to %. In contrast, contraceptive use among Muslim women in states where Sharia law has been introduced has remained negligible and a vast majority of married women do not use any method of birth control. The proportion of non-users slightly declined towards  among the younger women T A B L E I I I Decomposition of TFR change into educational change and fertility change. .   547  548  549  550  551  552  553  554  555  556  557  558  559  560  561  562  563  564  565  566  567  568  569  570  571  572  573  574  575  576  577  578  579  580  581  582  583  584  585  586  587  588 aged - years; however, this trend reversed between -, shortly after Sharia law was introduced. Ejelmi et al. () find that religion remains an important predictor of modern contraceptive use in north-eastern and north-western Nigeria even after controlling for number of individual and community level factors.
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 T H E C H A N G I N G R E L I G I O U S C O M P O S I T I O N O F N I G E R I
 M A R C I N S T O N A W S K I E T A L
Further examination of the DHS surveys reveals that women in Sharia states perceive unmet need for family planning. The proportion of nonusers who intend to use or are unsure about using some method of birth control in the future has increased among all groups during -, including Muslim women in Sharia states. The proportion of non-users who do not intend to use any method of birth control has dropped to % for Christians and % among Muslims in non-Sharia states in . However, the decline has halted among Muslim women in Sharia states in recent years and about % of non-users do not wish to use any contraception in future, see Table V . According to  DHS, % of Christian women currently not using contraception and % of Muslim women in non-Sharia states reported they would like to use contraception. The situation is very different among Muslim women in Sharia states, where only % of women below age  expressed a wish to use birth control, a little more than ·% among - year olds.
The main reason given for not intending to use any birth control in the future (by the non-users who do not intend to use any birth control) has shifted from wanting as many children as possible, which was the most prominent reason given by the Muslim women from Sharia states, towards opposition to contraception in the period from  to ,  see Table VI . This shift is visible for both Christians and T A B L E V Trends in the intentions not to use contraception among the married women not using any method to prevent pregnancy, by religion. Muslims in Sharia states. The growth in opposition to contraception, from % to % among Christians and % to % among Muslims may be related to, among other factors, more conservative religious views that stigmatise modern contraception. A smaller proportion of the respondents explicitly cited religious prohibition as the main reason for not using birth control in the future. Religious prohibition was cited more frequently by Muslims (% in  and % in ) than by Christians where the share actually declined (from % in  to % in ). Compared with , more Muslim non-users from Sharia states cited husband's opposition to birth control -up from about % to % in , while Christians saw a stagnation of around %. Due to this shift towards presumably more direct pressure not to take contraception, fewer cited disapproval of others as influential in their decision. This suggests that both the internalization of attitudes leading to disapproval of birth control and social pressure against use may have intensified in Sharia law states. Moreover, this shift is consistent with a significant body of literature documenting the pivotal role male fertility preferences play on fertility decisions in Nigerian society, particularly among the Hausa ethnic group predominant in northern Nigeria 
 T H E C H A N G I N G R E L I G I O U S C O M P O S I T I O N O F N I G E R I
Opposed to using contraception
Another difference between all Christian and Muslim non-users in Sharia states is illustrated in the reason for intention not to use contraception in the future. Here we observe that among Christians the rationale for not intending to use is more frequently related to barriers such as lack of knowledge or a lack of access to contraception (e.g. due to high price, no access, or health concerns). The aforementioned reasons have been increasingly cited by Christian non-users, by about % compared with about % of Muslims non-users in  (this percentage has not fluctuated). We assume that respondents citing barriers-related reasons are not principally opposed to birth control. If so, a larger proportion of Christian and a smaller proportion of Muslim women would intend to use some methods of preventing pregnancy if they were better informed, had financial means to buy contraceptives and had (better) access to facilities offering methods of family planning.  Problematic access to family planning facilities and services may indeed be a reason why Muslim women in Sharia states who perceive unmet need have little choice, in particular if reproductive choices are being made in highly unpredictable context (see Johnson-Hanks et al. ; Johnson-Hanks ). DHS data on the family planning services network in Nigeria do not allow for a more detailed analysis. However, we can conclude that the current opposition to modern contraceptive use is an important reason not to use birth control for Muslim women in Sharia states and it is as much embedded in as it sustains high fertility culture in the region.
P O P U L A T I O N P R O J E C T I O N S
Will Nigeria become a majority Muslim country?
We argue in the previous sections that the institutionalization of Sharia law has led to persistent high fertility as a result of the protective role it plays in sustaining a high fertility culture. With a small share of the Muslim population residing in non-Sharia states, the fertility of Shariastate Muslims drives the overall high fertility of Nigerian Muslims. The lack of convergence in Muslim-Christian fertility differentials will not only change the religious landscape of Nigeria, but can also affect overall population growth. If the greater fertility of Muslims is sustained, this will lead to faster population growth over time, particularly as the proportion of Muslims grows. However, if fertility rates for both Muslims and Christians were to converge and decline, this would imply a lower population growth in the coming decades. We study the possible consequences of different fertility trajectories on religious composition in Nigeria using a demographic projection model that takes into account differences in fertility, intergenerational transmissions of religion and age-distribution of religious beliefs (Goujon et al. ; Hackett et al. a; Stonawski et al. ).
Q2
The projection of population by age, sex and religion in Nigeria  is based on the demographic method of multi-state population projections  that is widely accepted by technical demographers (Samir et al. ; Hackett et al. a, b) . In order to illustrate the long-term consequences of fertility differentials by religion on the religious landscape of the country, we introduce four scenarios in the period of  years, from  to . The scenarios only differ in terms of fertility assumptions (see Figure ) :
() in the first scenario -Fert(conv) -we assume slow convergence in fertility between Muslims and Christians from initial levels observed in  that would lead to the same level and age-pattern for these groups by  (within  years). At each step of this scenario, TFR for the total population follows the UN medium assumptions (United Nations );  () in the second scenario -Fert(c) -the assumption is that fertility by religion is constant during the whole projection period. This we estimate using fertility age-patterns based on the  DHS and adjust them to meet baseline fertility level from the UN (United Nations ); () similar to Fert(c) -Fert(c) -fertility is constant but on the level estimated from the  DHS that are adjusted to be in line with the UN level in -; () the last scenario -Fert(o) -is designed to examine how religious composition would change if there was no difference in fertility between religious groups, and TFR of total population followed the UN medium scenario assumptions (United Nations ).
Because of a lack of empirical evidence on religion-specific mortality, we assume no mortality difference between religious groups. The course of change in mortality in - follows the  UN medium assumptions. Baseline inflow and outflow of migrants in Nigeria are calculated using estimates of international migration bilateral flows (Abel ).
Religion of migrants was estimated using information from the Pew Research Center's Faith on the Move project (Connor ) . In all scenarios we assume religious switching between Christians and Muslims. Evidence from the Global Attitudes Project of Pew Research Center suggests that around -% of males and -% females (both Muslims and Christians) convert during their life. We model this explicitly in the projections by introducing transition rates. The results from our projection model suggest that constant fertility levels from the baseline could lead to a dramatic change in population size in Nigeria. During the coming  years the population size is projected to increase from  million in  to  million if relative difference in fertility by religion is kept constant as observed in  (Fert (c)), and to  million, if fertility differentials from  is used (Fert(c)). Fertility following the UN medium trajectory (United Nations ) leads to  million people by  (Fert(conv) and Fert(o)). As a result of strong population growth, Nigeria may have the second largest Christian and fourth largest Muslim population by  (Hackett et al. a) .
In addition to strong overall population growth, it is likely that Nigeria's population will undergo significant changes in religious composition ( Figures  and ) . A shift away from the current shares seems inevitable, placing the country on a clear path towards becoming a majority Muslim country in the coming decades. Even if there were no differences in fertility between the two religious groups (Fert(o) scenario), the proportion of Christians would decrease from ·% in  to ·% in , whereas Muslims would gain · percentage points and for the first time in the history of a united Nigeria reach a majority of ·%. In this scenario the differences in population structure, migration, and religious switching between Muslims and Christians have a minor impact on religious composition (Fert(o) ).
Several other scenarios suggest a stronger increase in the size of the Muslim population resulting in a growing majority share of the total population. If the relative difference in fertility is projected from the  level, when the differential was small, the proportion of Christians drops to % and Muslims rise to %. In a situation of more pronounced and slowly diminishing fertility gap (Fert(conv)), the share of Muslims increases to almost % of Nigeria's population and Christians drops to % in . Finally, the scenario with the most pronounced fertility gap at the level of the  DHS and constant fertility -Fert (c) TFR: Muslims -·, Christians -· -shows that the Muslim population can reach as much as % whereas Christians can decline to as little as %. In ,  and  DHS data we see stable fertility differential between Christians and Muslims and the data so far do not support the convergence scenario. This does not mean that convergence is not possible in the future but for the coming years the share of the Muslim population will likely follow the Fert(c).
We assume in our scenarios, conservatively, that the fertility differentials between Christians and Muslims could decrease or remain constant at the baseline level. However, it is also possible that in the future the fertility of Christians will decrease following the demographic transition trajectory and Muslim fertility stagnates at the current level (e.g. due to a lack of modernisation and sustained high fertility culture). Such a divergence would lead to a far greater share of Muslims in the religious landscape of Nigeria -reaching as high as -% by .
C O N C L U S I O N S A N D D I S C U S S I O N
Nigeria is most likely going to become a majority Muslim country in no more than a couple of decades unless the differential between the 

Muslim and Christian fertility quickly converges in the near future. However, this is not likely to happen given the high fertility ideals, low prevalence of family planning, and slow educational improvements in Sharia states. Quite to the contrary, legal implementation of Sharia may sustain the high fertility culture by preventing modernisation as a result of opposition towards the Western influence and increased desires to preserve cultural differences in respect to the rest of Nigeria's population.
In this regard, the institutionalisation of Sharia law should be viewed as a symptom of societal preferences that have long been present throughout northern Nigeria. It is likely however that the ongoing normalisation of Sharia law will lead to greater societal pressure to conform to underlying tenets, thus reinforcing many practices contributing to higher fertility while forming a bulwark against Western influences conducive to lower fertility (on normalisation, see e.g. May & Finch ) . In Nigeria we are therefore witnessing the confluence of distinctly pronatalist traditions in sub-Saharan Africa (Bongaarts & Casterline ) with a conservative religious ideology, a synthesis which will likely continue to result in high ideal family size and sustained higher fertility.
Fertility intentions and preferences can be powerful in terms of shaping behaviour and they can also be important as a marker of how potentially unrestricted pronatalism penetrates religious and cultural norms following Sharia. Therefore, high fertility can be seen as an integral part of the local traditions and institutionalisation of Sharia law may be seen as a way to preserve local culture. High fertility ideals are a key aspect of high fertility culture and as we showed earlier more than % of women in Sharia states prefer large families of  and more children or 'any number of children God gives them'. Only % think that four or fewer children is ideal -this contrasts sharply with declining fertility ideals throughout the rest of Nigeria. Marriage customs, polygyny and in particular high divorce rates that result from liberal divorce regulations under Sharia are among other possible factors responsible for sustained high fertility among the majority of Muslims in Nigeria. We could not empirically investigate these potential influences due to data limitations, however, existing research supports this interpretation (e.g.
Izugbara & Ezeh ).
Nigeria is an outstanding case due to the uniquely balanced population share of the two main religions and the clear divergence in demographic trends. The high relevance of religion within the Nigerian context further underscores the usefulness of considering religion in demographic studies. According to the  Afrobarometer, both Muslims and Christians claim that religion is very important in their life (% of Muslims and % of Christians). Nigerian society is divided across religious, ethnic and regional lines with a long history of rivalry between the largely Muslim North and mostly Christian South. Moreover, religion is the most frequently cited reason of violent conflict in Nigeria besides land disputes, according to Afrobarometer ( and ). Religious conflict has intensified since the time of the survey; Boko Haram began committing atrocities in  and therefore it is likely that religion has become an even more important driver of political instability.
Our projections show that should this fertility gap remain constant, or slowly decrease (in the convergence scenario), Nigerian Muslims will have a clear % majority by , making it one of the largest Muslim states in the world. However, it is very likely that the gap in fertility can grow even further leading to a higher share of Muslims in Nigerian society. This discrepancy can ultimately bring significant change to democratic outcomes, redefine the political dynamics between traditionally comparable religious groups, and potentially call into question power-sharing agreements such as the rotating presidency. Indeed, within the context of an ethnically and religiously diverse country such as Nigeria, a newfound emphasis on religious identity coupled with religion-specific fertility differentials could very well be precursors to future sectarian conflict and carry significant political and economic implications for the region and the world.
N O T E S
. Source: Own calculations based on DHS . . Nigerian States: Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara . In the  census, which is the earliest reliable data source we found, .% of Nigeria's total population was Muslim, .% Animist, and a mere .% Christian. In the - census, the proportion of Muslims rose to .% and in the  census to .% while the share of Christians surpassed Animists, most likely due to conversion to other religions (.% of Christians in ). The share of Muslims grew most quickly in the Northern regions, amounting to about % of the population in - and  censuses (Mi : ).
. We base our analysis on Demographic and Health |Surveys , ,  and . DHS  was excluded because of the data quality issues that include underreporting of recent births in the order of about % and a sample bias towards more educated women (DHS report ). Thus the results of the  survey diverge from the trends obtained using the three other waves.
. TFR estimations were done using tfr STATA module (Schoumaker ). . Christians are comprising % of the population in the northern regions while about % of Muslims reside in the southern states (DHS ).
. Source: own estimates computed for -year period prior survey based on DHS  and . . We consider states from north-central, north-east and north-west as northern, and south-east, south-central and south-west as southern. This division differs from the Sharia, non-Sharia distinction we introduce later in the text because not all northern states have adopted Sharia.
